

Module 3



Module 3: Weapon Management

Module 3 at a Glance

Aim

The aim of this module is to familiarize participants with:

- UN policies on small arm control
- Location parameters of a weapon store
- The principles of the physical security of weapons
- The inventory management
- Reporting losses and investigations
- Determining surplus weapon stocks
- The secure transportation of weapons
- Conducting security risk assessment for weapon storage
- Compiling a Weapon Security Plan

Overview

Module 3 enables participants to explore secure weapon storage practices in T/PCC operations aligned with UN policies on small arms control. Participants will discuss factors for selecting weapon storage locations, principles of physical security, inventory management, and protocols for reporting and investigating losses. They will also cover the determination of surplus weapon stocks, security during transportation, and common failures in weapon controls. Additionally, participants will evaluate a completed security risk assessment for weapon storage and compile a Weapon Security Plan based on a provided scenario.


Lesson 3.1



Lesson 3.1: Secure Weapon Storage

Weapons and Ammunition Management in UN Peace Operations

In-person course
Lesson 15



Section 1. Lesson Specification**Course Details:**

Course Title:	Weapons and Ammunition Management in UN Peace Operations In-person training
Course Objective	2. T/PCCs engaged in safe and secure management of ammunition on UN peacekeeping operations.
Training Objective(s):	2.1 Explain UN policies and guidelines on ammunition management. 2.2 Apply UN policies and guidelines on Ammunition Management. 2.3 Apply UN policies on secure weapon storage 2.4 Compile explosive safety cases to qualify ammunition storage licenses

Lesson Details:

Lesson Number and Title:	L15. Secure Weapon Storage
Type of Lesson / Session:	In-person, Exercise
Duration:	90mins

Enabling Objectives, Key Learning Points & Training Outcomes:

Enabling Objectives:	Key learning Points:
2.3.1 Examine secure weapon storage practices	2.3.1.1 Describe the UN policies on small arm control. 2.3.1.2 Discuss the location parameters of a weapon store 2.3.1.3 Discuss the principles of the physical security of weapons 2.3.1.4 Discuss inventory management 2.3.1.5 Discuss reporting losses and investigations 2.3.1.6 Discuss determining surplus weapon stocks 2.3.1.7 Discuss the secure transportation of weapons 2.3.1.8 Examine commonly occurring failures related to weapon controls 2.3.1.9 Evaluate a completed security risk assessment for weapon storage 2.3.1.10 Compile a Weapon Security Plan based on a risk assessment that has been provided
Performance Statement:	<i>By the end of the lessons the participants will...</i> Examine secure weapon storage practices

Assessment Criteria:	There is no final assessment for this exercise, however, Instructors will use informal class discussion, questioning of participants and review the work by the participants to enable a positive feedback loop to be established to enhance the effectiveness of the learning.
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Resource requirements:

Instructor to participant ratio:	1:6 in syndicates. Maximum class size 15.
Interpreters:	1 per instructor
Training Facilities & Equipment:	Classroom,
Instructional tools & materials	projector and screen, flipchart, whiteboard
Participant Resources:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MOSAIC 05.20 • UN CARANA scenario narrative • Exercise handout • Full size printouts of some slides where required – see slide notes for details.
Training Safety Points:	<p>Trainer is to make participants aware of course risk assessment in relation to the specific training environment.</p> <p>An example of Health and Safety checklist for classrooms is available here for reference here: Health and safety checklist for classrooms (hse.gov.uk)</p>
Key Reference Documents:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UN Manual on Ammunition Management • UN Weapons and Ammunition Management Policy (WAM) • International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG) • Modular Small Arms Control Implementation compendium (MOSAIC) 05.20

SECTION 2: LESSON PLAN

Executive summary:

During this lesson participants will examine secure weapon storage practices on T/PCC operations in accordance with UN policies on small arm control. The participants will discuss the location parameters of a weapon store, the principles of the physical security of weapons, inventory management and the reporting of losses and associated investigations. They will also discuss determining surplus weapon stocks, the security of weapons during transportation and examine common occurring failures related to weapon controls. Finally, they will evaluate a completed security risk assessment for weapon storage and then compile a Weapon Security Plan based on a risk assessment that they are provided.

Setup:

Phase 1, Phase 2 (stages 1 & 2) and Phase 3 will be delivered to the class as a single collective.

Phase 3 (stage 3) will be conducted in small groups (6-8 participants) each with a dedicated instructor.

Conduct:

Phase 1. Introduction (Time allocation - 10 min)

- Introduce the objectives of the lesson.
- Highlight the essential manuals and guidance documents that support the safe management, storage and transport of weapons on UN operations.
- Handout the MOSAIC 05.20 to participants.

Phase 2. Development

Stage 1 (Time allocation 20 mins) – Weapons storage management

- Discuss with the participants the general make-up of weapons storage, the locations where weapons are typically held and emphasise the need for tight security and good environmental conditions.
- Ask the participants to provide examples of a poor standard of weapon storage and the implications this can have on a mission. List these implications on the flip chart and post it to the wall.
- Introduce the importance of accurate weapon accounting, while discussing stock checks, personal access, issuing and receipt of weapons and effective

stock management procedures that ensure the security and serviceability of weapons.

- Examine commonly occurring failures related to weapon controls

Stage 2 (Time allocation 25 mins) – Weapons Security Plan

- Discuss the importance of physical security for weapons which includes building or container suitability and internal racking systems.
- Explore the use of fencing or other security infrastructures on the perimeters to control access and observation.
- Highlight the need to adopt a suitable standard operating procedure. Give examples and discuss.
- Discuss the various types of access control measures that can be employed to safely store weapons.
- Discuss the secure transportation of weapons
- Introduce the concept of a Weapon Security Plan, discussing the principles of physical security and outlining the several factors that need to be considered.
- Provide the participants with an example of a complete physical security risk assessment for a weapons storage area. Work through this risk assessment with the participants to evaluate it and ask questions to check learning and understanding.

Stage 3 (Time allocation 25 mins) – Participant exercise

- In groups, the participants are to undertake a Security assessment for the safe storage of weapons based on the UN CARANA scenario (see slides for exercise detail and instructions).
- All 'Exercise Brief' and 'Exercise Deliverables' slides to be printed and distributed to participants (slides 37- 42)
- The participants will examine the provided security information, storage conditions and weapons allotments and design a suitable Security Plan to ensure the safe storage of the listed weapons.
- Instructors are to work closely with the groups to help them identify hazards, develop mitigating factors and compile a suitable Weapon Security Plan for this operation.
- When the groups have completed their groupwork, work through the answers with the class and ask questions.

Phase 3. Consolidation (Time allocation - 10 min)

- Review Enabling Objective and Key Learning Points (see Section 1), drawing out any common themes.

- Look ahead to the next lesson of the course:
 - STX ERA & Camp Takeover

Slide 1




Key Reference Documents for this lesson:

- UN Manual on Ammunition Management
- UN Weapons and Ammunition Management Policy (WAM)
- International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG)

All photographs in this lesson are © United Nations unless otherwise stated.

Slide 2



The slide features a blue vertical bar on the left side containing the United Nations logo at the top and the word "Objective" in white text. To the right of this bar is a large white rectangular area. Within this white area is a smaller blue rectangle containing the text "Examine secure weapon storage practices" in white.

Main idea/objective for slide:


Phase 1. Introduction - Introduce the objectives of the lesson.

(Enabling Objective: 2.3.1 Examine secure weapon storage practices.)

What the instructor should cover (in addition to slide content)

By the end of this training session the participant will examine secure weapon storage practices

Slide 3



Lesson overview

- Describe the UN policies on small arm control.
- Discuss the location parameters of a weapon store and the principles of the physical security of weapons
- Discuss inventory management, reporting losses and investigations, and determining surplus weapon stocks
- Discuss the secure transportation of weapons
- Examine commonly occurring failures related to weapon controls
- Evaluate a completed security risk assessment for weapon storage
- Compile a Weapon Security Plan based on a provided risk assessment


Main idea/objective for slide:
Introduce the Key Learning Points

Key Learning Points

- 2.3.1.1 Describe the UN policies on small arm control.
- 2.3.1.2 Discuss the location parameters of a weapon store
- 2.3.1.3 Discuss the principles of the physical security of weapons
- 2.3.1.4 Discuss inventory management
- 2.3.1.5 Discuss reporting losses and investigations
- 2.3.1.6 Discuss determining surplus weapon stocks
- 2.3.1.7 Discuss the secure transportation of weapons
- 2.3.1.8 Examine commonly occurring failures related to weapon controls
- 2.3.1.9 Evaluate a completed security risk assessment for weapon storage


2.3.1.10 Compile a Weapon Security Plan based on a risk assessment that has been provided

Slide 4



Phase 1. Introduction (Time allocation - 10 min)

Slide 5



Reference Documents

- MOSAIC 05.20 Stockpile management: Weapons
- Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UN Programme of Action)
- Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition (UN Firearms Protocol)
- UN Peace Operations
 - 2019.03 Weapons and Ammunition Management (Policy)
 - 2019.04 Loss of Weapons and Ammunition in Peace Operations (SOP)
 - 2019.27 United Nations Manual on Ammunition Management (Manual)
 - UN COE Manual


Main idea/objective for slide:

Highlight the essential manuals and guidance documents that support the safe management, storage and transport of weapons on UN operations.

What the instructor should cover (in addition to slide content)

- Make the participants aware of the overarching documents regarding weapons management within the UN and Handout the MOSAIC 05.20 to participants.
- For peace operations highlight the relevance of the final three documents, and mention that these are all available at the DAG repository online for registered users

Slide 6



Definitions

Small arm

any man-portable lethal weapon designed for individual use that expels or launches, is designed to expel or launch, or may be readily converted to expel or launch a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive

- NOTE 1 Includes: Revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, sub-machine guns, assault rifles and light machine guns, as well as their parts, components and ammunition.
- NOTE 2 Excludes: Antique small arms and their replicas.


Light weapon

Any man-portable lethal weapon designed for use by two or three persons serving as a crew (although some may be carried and used by a single person) that expels or launches, is designed to expel or launch, or may be readily converted to expel or launch a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive

- NOTE 1 includes: Heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems, portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems, and mortars of a calibre of less than 100 millimeters, as well as their parts, components and ammunition.
- NOTE 2 Excludes: Antique light weapons and their replicas.

Main idea/objective for slide:**Define small arms and light weapons definitions****Most UN Missions weapons are SALW (but not all)**

Slide 7



UN Weapons and Ammunition Management Policy

- “Missions with weapons and ammunition shall develop specific, tailored Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) based on this Policy”
- “SOPs for national contingents/ individual units may also be based on national WAM policies and shall be in accordance with this Policy or may exceed the standards described in this Policy.”

Main idea/objective for slide:

Highlight the essential manuals and guidance documents that support the safe management, storage and transport of weapons on UN operations.


What the instructor should cover (in addition to slide content)

Two key points for peace operations are covered within the WAM Policy,

- The mission is required to develop specific and tailored SOPs, this is because a policy is the overarching document and cannot cover all the requirements

- National contingents then must develop their own SOP, it must be in accordance with the UN WAM policy or can exceed it... but important to note that it must at least met the requirements.

Slide 8



What is required within an SOP?

- Purpose
- Scope
- Policy
- Roles & Responsibilities
- Terms & Definitions
- References
- Monitoring & Compliance
- Contact

Main idea/objective for slide:

Highlight the essential manuals and guidance documents that support the safe management, storage and transport of weapons on UN operations.

What the instructor should cover (in addition to slide content)

Before revealing the list, ask the class what they believe is needed to make a worthwhile SOP? And what should not be included in a Mission Level SOP?

Then display the list of points / sections accepted within a mission level SOP

Discuss the risk of a mission level SOP becoming too prescriptive at unit level. The long screw driver of micro management...


Slide 9



Phase 2. Development (Time allocation - 70 min)

Stage 1 (Time allocation 20 mins) – Weapons storage management

Slide 10



Stockpile Weapons

- Operational weapons
- Operational replacement weapons
- Training weapons
- Weapons awaiting disposal
- Experimental weapon
- Reservists weapons

} not normally on
UN Missions

Main idea/objective for slide:

Discuss different classifications of weapons within the stockpile and the importance of managing them all.

What the instructor should cover (in addition to slide content)


We understand the definition of what a weapon is and what is covered under the policy, but it is important to remember also that the weapons held can also be classified as within their role in the organisation. Typically we will think of the operational weapons, those which are used day to day however depending on the organisation needs, size and structure there may be other classifications of weapons within the stockpile.

It is essential that all weapons within the stockpile are properly managed, from initial procurement / acquisition all the way through their life to final disposal.

For a typical UN deployment there will really only be Operational weapons, however there may be a training requirement for the national capacity so that could include training weapons.

And there may be weapons awaiting repatriation to the home country

Slide 11



Stockpile Location Determining Factors

- Requirements for access
- Response time in the event of emergency
- Local planning considerations
- Local infrastructure
- Environmental issues
- Number of security personnel in an area
- Number of security personnel required to secure the stockpile location

Main idea/objective for slide:

Discuss with the participants the general make-up of weapons storage, the locations where weapons are typically held and emphasise the need for tight security and good environmental conditions.


What the instructor should cover (in addition to slide content)

Considering the factors and examples which we have just discussed we can then remember these determining factors when looking for the best location to store weapons.

If our Unit SOP requires 4 personnel to guard a weapon store, having decentralised stores for each company could prove to be a strain on manpower.

Perhaps the stores can be located centrally but access to different rooms/containers is assigned only to specific persons.

The actual size of the area may dictate what factors are to be considered further. If the camp is too big maybe there is a need to have several storage locations for security or perhaps the camp is small, and the unit is forced to use one location.



Location Parameters of Weapon Store

- Risk assessment for the stockpile
- Value of the facility & contents
- Risk = Consequence x Likelihood

Main idea/objective for slide:

Discuss with the participants the general make-up of weapons storage, the locations where weapons are typically held and emphasise the need for tight security and good environmental conditions.

What the instructor should cover (in addition to slide content)

Having considered the determining factors, we must then prepare a risk assessment for the store / stockpile.

This risk assessment is a crucial step in setting up a weapons storage location. While risks can never be removed completely; they must be reduced to as low as reasonably practicable. Essentially the risk level must be tolerable to the relevant authority or mission leadership.

One part of any risk assessment needs to consider the value of the facility and contents. Value can be purely financial but there can be other aspects, how much will it affect your own operations if all the contents are lost? And equally how much will it affect your adversaries capabilities by removing those weapons from your possession.


Discuss with the class the possible implications of a UN weapons store being captured by combatants.

In simple terms we consider the Risk as being $\text{Consequence} \times \text{Likelihood}$ as covered in Lesson 10.

Obviously frequency is self explanatory, in how often we expect this certain hazard to occur,

When we are considering the Hazard though we need to look at a wide range of hazards which will affect the risk assessment.

Slide 13



Location Parameters of Weapon Store

- Risk assessment of for the stockpile
- Financial value of the facility & contents
- Risk = Hazard x Frequency
- Active Hazards
 - Loss
 - Theft
 - Sabotage
 - Attack

Main idea/objective for slide:

Discuss with the participants the general make-up of weapons storage, the locations where weapons are typically held and emphasise the need for tight security and good environmental conditions.

What the instructor should cover (in addition to slide content)

Firstly if we consider the active hazards,

Ask the class what they feel could be considered an Active Hazard

Then explain the loss, theft, sabotage and attack hazards.


Who are the likely perpetrators?

What is the likely motivations?

Provide a mission scenario.... In MONUSCO in DRC what would be the greatest concern from the list?

Which current Peacekeeping mission could face a risk of sabotage? Why would someone want to sabotage a UN mission? Possibly Mali where the insurgents want the international community to disengage so they can place more pressure on the host government.

Slide 14



Location Parameters of Weapon Store

- Risk assessment of for the stockpile
- Financial value of the facility & contents
- Risk = Hazard x Frequency
- Active Hazards
- Passive Hazards
 - Natural Disasters
 - Floods
 - Volcanos
 - Earthquakes
 - Fires

Main idea/objective for slide:

Discuss with the participants the general make-up of weapons storage, the locations where weapons are typically held and emphasise the need for tight security and good environmental conditions.

What the instructor should cover (in addition to slide content)

While our risk assessment is being done it very easy to be focused on the active hazards, this can be a risk itself because we forget to consider the greater passive hazards which could be present.

Ask the class what they believe will be classed as a Passive Hazard?

Natural disasters can be devastating, and far harder to protect against in comparison to the active hazards....


If the greatest active hazard is considered theft you apply more security, more fences, more locks and more controls.... But if your greatest passive hazard is an earthquake or volcano what can you do?

It is important to consider these factors within our risk assessment,

Discuss with the class and seek examples from UN missions or from their home countries where passive hazards have played a role or impacted their security forces, even if not in a weapons storage situation but impacted operations in general.

Often we will think to rainy seasons and flooding, and in many mission areas we have adapted to operating and even thriving in those situations, but what if there typically a major increase in water levels every ten years.

What if the impact of global warming is creating a greater variations in levels each year... do you need to factor these issues into your risk assessment so that the appropriate mitigations are put in place.



Location Parameters of Weapon Store

- Risk assessment for the stockpile
- Financial value of the facility & contents
- Risk = Hazard x Frequency
- Active Hazards
- Passive Hazards
- Attractiveness of a facility to attack

Main idea/objective for slide:

Discuss with the participants the general make-up of weapons storage, the locations where weapons are typically held and emphasise the need for tight security and good environmental conditions.

What the instructor should cover (in addition to slide content)

Ask the class what they believe leads to the Attractiveness of a facility to attack?

The chance of success for the preparator?

The chance of media coverage?


The opportunity to discredit the mission?

The storage of items which can be easily sold on the black market?

The location being known for having weak security?

Refer to the adage 'proper preparations prevent poor performance', so the actions we do today protect us tomorrow.

The harder the target, the less attractive it will be to attackers



Location Parameters of Weapon Store

- Risk assessment for the stockpile
- Financial value of the facility & contents
- Risk = Hazard x Frequency
- Active Hazards
- Passive Hazards
- Attractiveness of a facility to attack
- Vulnerability Internal
 - Espionage
 - Theft
 - Loss

Main idea/objective for slide:

Discuss with the participants the general make-up of weapons storage, the locations where weapons are typically held and emphasise the need for tight security and good environmental conditions.

What the instructor should cover (in addition to slide content)

Again with our risk assessments we typically look outside the wire... but there are also vulnerabilities to be considered internally.

Espionage: are local staff or contractors given access to the area? Typically this will be necessary at some times, how is that managed? Who grants access? Who supervises? Are we letting the facility be seen as an easy target?


We want the locals who work for us to regard our weapons and ammunition stores as impenetrable. While we always tell them that they should never talk about our security arrangements and facilities outside of work. We cannot be naive to think that it won't happen to some extent.

So which is better for us? The locals to say: "oh my the security is so tight in that place you can do nothing without permission" or "those people are so relaxed and easy going it is nice to work there"?

Also it is sadly true that sometimes there can be motivations even within our own units, personnel might need extra money and could be getting extorted, or possibly they have been radicalised and are willing to steal from the organisation.

If these hazards exist they need to be recorded in the risk assessment.

Slide 17



Location Parameters of Weapon Store

- Risk assessment of for the stockpile
- Financial value of the facility & contents
- Risk = Hazard x Frequency
- Active Hazards
- Passive Hazards
- Attractiveness of a facility to attack
- Vulnerability Internal
- Vulnerability External
 - Sabotage
 - Terrorist attack
 - Conflict

Main idea/objective for slide:

Discuss with the participants the general make-up of weapons storage, the locations where weapons are typically held and emphasise the need for tight security and good environmental conditions.

What the instructor should cover (in addition to slide content)

Typically the primary concern is the external vulnerabilities.

Sabotage can discredit a mission, arm an insurgent group increase the risk level for mobile operations, provide new weapon systems to insurgents which makes implementing the mission mandate harder.

And if we consider the terrorist attack or conflict in a different perspective, not alone to this weapon storage location but generally in the area of operations

Can this weapon storage site adapt should there be a change in the threat level to the area.


Discuss with the class some of the implications a mission may face?

New IED threat present?

An extremist group specifically targeting the mission personnel?

An increased size of the mission for a surge to conduct new operations?

Slide 18



Physical Security of Weapons Principles

- Based on risk assessment
- Included in design stage
- Weapons and Ammunition should be stored separately
- Particularly hazardous weapons disassembled and stored separately
- Effective perimeter security
- Access controls properly in place
 - Controlled at all times
 - Restricted to authorised personnel only
 - Authorised personnel should have security clearance
- Personnel must be trained
- Temporary personnel should be accompanied

Main idea/objective for slide:

Introduce the importance of accurate weapon accounting, while discussing stock checks, personal access, issuing and receipt of weapons and effective stock management procedures that ensure the security and serviceability of weapons.

What the instructor should cover (in addition to slide content)


Using the risk assessment we will be able to decide on the physical security aspects of the weapon store.

There are a number of key principles which should be remembered as a basis

Discuss with the class the principles, asking for the class to propose an example of why these are principles

Why is it based on the risk assessment? – so that you have a factual plan, not based on experience from a different mission which may not be relevant
Why included in the design stage? – easier and cheaper to build properly at the stage, especially when deciding the perimeters of camps compared to retro fitting

Continue this discussion through each point.



Physical Security of Weapons

Aim

- Thwart any attempted security breach
- Deter and reduce attempted Incursions or internal thefts
- Immediately detect a security breach or threat
- Assess the scale of any security breach or threat
- Increase the time to illegally remove weapons from stores
- Allow security personnel to respond properly

Main idea/objective for slide:

Introduce the importance of accurate weapon accounting, while discussing stock checks, personal access, issuing and receipt of weapons and effective stock management procedures that ensure the security and serviceability of weapons.

What the instructor should cover (in addition to slide content)


Start by asking the class what is the aim of the physical security and discussing the responses?

Write the points on the white board to take note of them as the discussion progresses. If needed move the discussion beyond the theft topic to the wider implications and benefits of the physical security.

After the discussion read through the points, emphasising any which have been missed in the discussion with the class.

Summarise by highlight not only the simple benefit of preventing theft but all the indirect benefits achieved by having properly adopted physical security measures.

Slide 20



Physical Security System

- Physical security requirements
- Physical security components
- Security regulations
- Standard operating procedures
- Security plan
- Staff vetting and selection
- Access control

Main idea/objective for slide:

Introduce the importance of accurate weapon accounting, while discussing stock checks, personal access, issuing and receipt of weapons and effective stock management procedures that ensure the security and serviceability of weapons.

What the instructor should cover (in addition to slide content)

Discuss with the class the elements of a Physical Security System.

Use the analogy of a gate....

Will a big gate provide security?

Not unless there is a fence either side of the gate?

Will the gate and the fence provide security?

Not unless there is a key to lock the gate?

Will the key the gate and the fence provide security?

Not unless there access control to control the key.

Will the key, gate, fence, access control provide security?


Not unless the proper staff are vetted to prevent infiltration.

Will the key, gate, fence, access control and vetting provide security?

Not unless there is a security plan and SOP about who is allowed to draw the keys at what times with whose authority and whose oversight...


Display the list of elements within the physical security system to the class

Each piece is like a jenga tower, without some you still may have a tower but to build a strong tower that will last you need to have them all, in the right place doing the right thing



Access Control

- Keys
- Combinations / Codes
- Entry to weapons storage area
 - Visitor log
 - Name
 - Job title
 - Reason for visit
 - Date
 - Time of entry / exit



Main idea/objective for slide:
 Introduce the importance of accurate weapon accounting, while discussing stock checks, personal access, issuing and receipt of weapons and effective stock management procedures that ensure the security and serviceability of weapons.

What the instructor should cover (in addition to slide content)
 What is Access control?


Briefly discuss with the class the various elements of access control.

Highlight that they do not necessarily need to have all these parts combinations and codes and keys... but the one which make sense in their specific case

The visitor log should be maintained, and it can be an easy point of reference for a commander doing an audit on his weapons stores to check that procedures are being followed properly.

Photograph from UN DDR WAM Course

Slide 22



Physical Security Infrastructure

Building

- Walls
- Roof / Ceilings
- Windows
- Floors
- Doors & Gates
- Locks & padlocks
- Intrusion detection systems
- Alarm detection and response time
- Records and tests
- Weapon storage racks

Main idea/objective for slide:


Introduce the importance of accurate weapon accounting, while discussing stock checks, personal access, issuing and receipt of weapons and effective stock management procedures that ensure the security and serviceability of weapons.

What the instructor should cover (in addition to slide content)

Start by asking the class to look around the room and identify the infrastructure elements that are present in the class room which they would expect to see in a weapons store.


Then read through the list and highlight the relevance of each

For the floors it must be able to hold the weight of the weapons in that room, which could be very heavy for support weapons, and must be secure enough to make sure someone does not tunnel underneath the store to steal the weapons


 **Physical Security Infrastructure**

Perimeter


- Fencing Classes




Picture 1: Class 1 security fencing



Picture 2: Class 2 security fencing



Picture 3: Class 3 security fencing



Picture 4: Class 4 security fencing

Main idea/objective for slide:
Introduce the importance of accurate weapon accounting, while discussing stock checks, personal access, issuing and receipt of weapons and effective stock management procedures that ensure the security and serviceability of weapons.

What the instructor should cover (in addition to slide content)
 As per MOSAIC 05.20 there is four classes of fencing


A Class 1 security fence provides minimum security and is at least 1.5m high. It is intended only to mark a boundary and will delay a determined intruder only for a short time.

A Class 2 security fence is an anti-intruder fence that offers a degree of resistance to climbing and breaching by an opportunistic, unskilled intruder using material and breaching items that are readily to hand.

A Class 3 security fence is an intermediate security barrier designed to deter and delay a resourceful intruder who has access to a limited range of hand tools. The design and construction provide resistance to attempts at climbing and breaching. A Class 3 security fence offers a good balance between delay to intrusion and cost

A Class 4 security fence is a high-security barrier designed to offer the maximum deterrence and delay to a skilled, determined and well-equipped intruder. It is designed and constructed to offer a high degree of resistance to a climbing and breaching.

Photographs from IATG 09.10



Main idea/objective for slide:
participant activity to plan physical security infrastructure for a scenario

participant Activity
 Using the four classes of fencing ask the participants to individually decide which they would use for each of the perimeter fences displayed in the diagram


What the instructor should cover (in addition to slide content)
 Instructor Solution:

UN Camp Perimeter – Class 4 – greatest threat and needs the highest level

Unit Camp Perimeter – Class 1 – unlikely to be getting breached by persons inside the UN Camp perimeter, while there is a lot of people present in the area so should provide a good deterrent and thus saves money

UN Armory Perimeter – Minimum Class 2 but really the highest class affordable

Slide 25



Physical Security Infrastructure

Perimeter

- Fencing
- Clear zones
- Drainage
- Perimeter illumination
- Perimeter intrusion detection system (PIDS)
- Visual surveillance systems
- Patrols and dogs

Main idea/objective for slide:**Factors to consider when planning physical security infrastructure**What the instructor should cover (in addition to slide content)


Other factors to consider when selecting and planning fencing are listed

Discuss with the class highlighting the need to balance costs with practicalities and realities.

For example, If a base location is in an extremely remote location, possibly cut off from road resupply for 6 months a year, is it practical to expect the resources to be diverted away from drinking water for the camp to all the helicopters carry fencing?


Are there other aspects such as dogs and patrols which can be used to improve security where you may have a short falling in the fencing resources

Slide 26



Physical Security Unit Storage

- Smaller scale
 - Platoon level outpost
 - Temporary patrol base
 - Crew served weapons
- Armouries
- Secure rooms
- Secure cabinets



Main idea/objective for slide:**Discuss the variety of weapons storage solutions that might be required**What the instructor should cover (in addition to slide content)

While the emphasis on this presentation is towards the units main store each unit will typically be required to have a variety of weapons storage solutions for differing purposes

Discuss with the class cases when the unit must have other storage solutions


Platoon level posts, although typically personnel will be armed there should be the ability to store weapons safely if needed

What is the logical solution for a Temporary Patrol base? Based on how long the base will need to be used and what size unit is occupying it? Where will captured weapons be placed? Could an APC be used? All of these things are just factors and considerations, if possible the unit SOP should cover as many of the situations as possible. This ensures that things have been properly thought through and considered and a commander is not being forced to find a solution on the spot.

Secure rooms or secure cabinets could be a requirement for staff officers in a Sector or Force HQ, overall access control may be harder but they will still need the possibility to store weapons safely

Photograph is © AMAT/GICHD

Slide 27



Inventory Management

- Separation of powers
- Stock checks
- Storage management
- Mission level data
 - The number of weapons being held by each unit
 - Physical location of unit stores
 - Condition of weapon stockpiles
 - Requirements for changes based on units rotations / new units arrival
 - Especially important for support weapons
 - Coordinated with the Mission Concept of Operations

Main idea/objective for slide:

Principles of accurate inventory management

What the instructor should cover (in addition to slide content)


When it comes to managing the actual inventory of a store there are several simple steps and processes which can be enforced by the Unit SOP to ensure accuracy and accountability for the stock.

Firstly the separation of power, where there is external oversight of the unit who has day to day access and control of the inventory, separate stock checks conducted by someone external to the specific unit provides for a greater level of oversight on issues and discrepancies.

This separation can also be included in the management of keys and other access control measures.


Within the mission there is a requirement to accurately understand certain levels of data, for example the Contingent Owned Equipment reimbursements are based on the number of serviceable weapons which a unit has.

Remember though the level data required by the mission is looking a broader picture and it should be expected that Unit level data will be more detailed.



Inventory Management

- Unit level data
 - Specific location of each weapon
 - Make
 - Model
 - Calibre
 - Serial number
 - Holding unit
- Unit issuing of weapons
 - Name and signature of the individual removing the weapon from store
 - Date and time of issue and return of weapon
 - Make, model and serial number of weapon
 - Purpose of removal




ARMAMENTS			
CREW SERVED MACHINE GUNS (11 TO 15MM)			
Total: 8			
1	12.7MM	525956	✓
2	12.7MM	2119988	✓
3	12.7MM	96205	✓
4	12.7MM	828464	✓
5	12.7MM	1358002	✓
6	12.7MM	804436	✓
7	12.7MM	661742	✓
8	12.7MM	481043	✓
CREW SERVED MACHINE GUNS (UP TO 10MM)			
Total: 2			
1	7.62MM	310085	✓
2	7.62MM	310105	✓

Main idea/objective for slide:
Principles of accurate inventory management

What the instructor should cover (in addition to slide content)
 Within a specific unit they must know exactly where the weapon is, the sub unit which it is assigned to and other relevant information. The servicing and inspecting of weapons will be controlled at unit level not mission level, the specific serial number will allow proper tracking and planning of when inspection is required.

Then when a weapon is being issued, even on a temporary basis for a security tasking or patrol the unit is required to ensure that there is an accurate ledger of the relevant information.

Slide 29



Reporting within UN Missions

- Arrival inspection in line with COE Manual
- Weekly Unit count of weapons and ammunition
- Monthly report to Head of Military/Police Component status report -
 - No weapons / Ammunition were lost
 - The following Weapons / Ammunition were lost
 - No weapons / ammunition were retrieved
 - The following lost weapons and ammunition were retrieved
- HOMC/HOPC quarterly report to UNHQ

Main idea/objective for slide:
Specific reporting requirements for UN Missions

What the instructor should cover (in addition to slide content)


In a peacekeeping mission there are specific reporting requirements which can be found in the WAM Policy and SOP on weapon loses.

Upon arrival into theatre there will be an arrival inspection conducted by the COE unit, this is essential for reimbursements

Then the unit has the requirement to ensure there is a weekly check completed, and then on a monthly basis this information must be submitted by the units to the Head of Military / Police components as per the WAM policy.

The mission then must submit a quarterly report to UNHQ which will amalgamate all the relevant reports from the units.

Slide 30



Reporting Losses

- Investigated officially
- Depending on the incident it may include a formal Board of Inquiry
- Key information required by the SOP on Weapon & Ammo Losses
- Identity of the weapon
- Make, model, calibre, serial number
- Date, location, unit
- Summary of circumstances
- Explanation
- Actions taken
- Recommendations
- Details of weapon recovery if relevant
- Circumstances of recovery

Reference DOS/2020.10 Boards of Inquiry (BOI) (SOP)

Main idea/objective for slide:

Outline the process for reporting losses

What the instructor should cover (in addition to slide content)

From the actual BoI SOP the focus of any potential
Print loss reporting form

What caused the occurrence?


Was anyone responsible for the occurrence, if so, who, and to what extent?

Whether any United Nations rules and regulations were contravened? If so,
identify the contravened rules and regulations and the particular aspects
thereof;

Whether any individual(s) has/have been victimized by the occurrence and
whether the negative effect of the occurrence was directly attributable

to the performance by the victim of duties on behalf of the United Nations (service incurred);
Whether the relevant UN procedures, regulations and in place at the time of the occurrence were adequate and properly followed.

Slide 31



Managing Surplus Weapon Stocks

- Statement of Unit Requirement (SUR)
- Change to mandate
- Change to unit size
- Change to geographic footprint
 - More / less bases
- Repatriated to home country. No weapon disposal conducted on mission.

Main idea/objective for slide:

Importance of managing surplus weapon stocks on UNPO

What the instructor should cover (in addition to slide content)

While MOSAIC 05.20 has a detailed section on managing surplus weapons we need to look at this issue in the context of UN Peacekeeping missions

The SUR should have been designed originally to properly reflect the needs of the unit, yet there are often unforeseeable changes which occur during a missions life that require adjust, reshaping and realignment of a missions focus.

Discuss with the class where missions have had changes? Ask if any participant can give an example of each


Mandate – UNMISS South Sudan Mission in 2013 where the focus went from transition to the local government to protection of civilians

Unit size – UNIFIL Lebanon in 2006 the mission was under 3500 personnel and then there was a 33 day war and the mission swelled to over 10,000 within six months

Geographic footprint – Lebanon needed more bases in 2006 while DRC as provinces are handed over to the government the number of locations reduced.

Ultimately there is a requirement for weapons to be repatriated to the home country. While there can be provision to destroy ammunition in country at the end of a deployment there is not typically such provisions for weapons.

Ask the class why they believe the UN wants weapons repatriated at the end of mission? It is the TCC responsibility, there will typically be better control of weapons in the home country, leaving weapons in the mission area could lead to them being misused.



Secure Transportation of Weapons

- Shipments coordinated through MovCon
- General considerations
 - Quantity, Types, Times
 - Minimise the movements if possible
 - Who provides security during transport
- Detailed OPORD required for the movement - G5 Plans

Main idea/objective for slide:

Outline the secure transportation of weapons on UNPO

What the instructor should cover (in addition to slide content)


While a UN Mission will utilise the deployment, rotations and repatriations through the Mission MOVCON it is important the Unit and TCC still take responsibility for the relevant aspects as it would with any move of sensitive equipment.

The Mission MOVCON unit will be on hand to help with the documentation required, be that DG notes or customs clearance. It is important that the unit are aware of the process should they need to conduct any movements other than the deployment, rotation and repatriation.

The general consideration will be consistent regardless of whether it is a Unit or a MOVCON arranged convoy.

For a unit or sector it will typically rely on an OPORD from the relevant U5 office to arrange coordination of any supporting units which may be required.

Slide 33



Failures in Weapon Control

Report
October 2017

MAKING A TOUGH JOB MORE DIFFICULT

Loss of Arms and Ammunition in Peace Operations

Eric G. Berman, Mihaela Racovita, and Matt Schroeder

MPOME
MAKING PEACE OPERATIONS MORE EFFECTIVE

small arms survey

[SAS-MPOME-Report-2.pdf \(smallarmssurvey.org\)](https://smallarmssurvey.org/SAS-MPOME-Report-2.pdf)

Main idea/objective for slide:
Highlight study on failures in Weapon control

What the instructor should cover (in addition to slide content)

Although a few years old there is an excellent study available for people who are interested in seeing some of the challenges which have happened on peace operations from 1993 to 2017.

Noting that peace operations have changed over the period. Today's missions are frequently larger, more complex, and more dangerous than their predecessors. Peace operations are only likely to become more challenging in the future. The loss of arms and ammunition in peace operations is neither infrequent nor inconsequential. This Survey has identified losses in at least 20 missions undertaken by the UN, several other organizations. Losses include not


only assault rifles and pistols, but also armored vehicles and numerous types of light weapons, such as heavy machine guns, grenade launchers, heavy mortars, and recoilless guns.

Lethal materiel is lost in a variety of ways and settings. While political sensitivities and opacity in reporting have resulted in misleading categorizations in UN sources, documented losses take place during everyday operations (such as patrol or escort missions), during movements of goods or supplies (by land or water), at the front or back end of tours of duty, and at fixed sites (residences, depots, bases). Incidents range from the seizure of a few rifles from patrols to the wholesale looting of weapons and ammunition from arsenals.

The report notes that the loss of small arms and ammunition is not always preventable. Sometimes peacekeepers are in the wrong place at the wrong time, and some arms depots are breached not because of lax stockpile security, but because the assailants are determined and well armed. This study looks at such incidents (including seizure resulting from military clashes, and forced abandonment) alongside losses resulting from less-than-best practice and corruption.

The UN's system for managing and controlling the movement of contingent-owned equipment provides the framework for a rigorous stockpile security and transport control regime for weapons and ammunition. Less is known about the challenges confronting officials and contingents serving in non-UN peace operations. Greater access to the many documents detailing the policies, procedures, and guidelines of both UN and non-UN peace operations would improve understanding of existing control measures and the gaps in these controls.

Thus the UN and other organizations undertaking peace operations are part of the solution, not part of the problem. At the same time, the focus on properly supporting and overseeing Blue Helmets must be accompanied by appropriate engagement with Green Helmets and the development of good practice when managing their arms and ammunition. Moving forward, much more can be done to better understand the scale and scope of the problem, its causation, and the efficacy of checks and balances, and to develop indicators for accountability and performance.



Risk Assessment

Key Definitions

Threat: A potential cause of harm initiated by deliberate actions.

Hazard: A potential cause of harm resulting from non-deliberate actions.

Vulnerability: A weakness that can allow a threat or hazard to cause harm.

Risk Matrix		Hazard				
		Negligible	Minor	Moderate	Severe	Critical
Frequency	Very Likely	Low	Medium	High	Very High	Unacceptable
	Likely	Low	Medium	High	High	Very High
	Moderately Likely	Low	Low	Medium	High	High
	Unlikely	Low	Low	Low	Medium	Medium
	Very Unlikely	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low


Remember that earlier we said the risk was the hazard by the frequency or Consequence by likelihood (probability)

It is worth noting that with risk assessments there are many different ways, all based around the same principles

If we use a matrix like with Hazards and Frequency we will be getting a risk rating.

It will be for the leadership / management to decide on whether they are willing to accept a risk rating of Medium or High... and that decision will be informed by a broader perspective on the issue and potential organisation risk to the TCC or to the mission.

Slide 35



Example risk assessment


	Hazard	Frequency	Risk Rating	Mitigations	Residual Risk
Attack by former Rebels	Minor	Moderately Likely	Low	N/A	Low
Theft by personnel within the UN Camp	Severe	Likely	High	Implement strict access controls	Medium
Bush fires (natural or sabotage)	Moderate	Likely	High	Improve the fire breaks around the entire camp	Medium
Highly sought after weapons stored here e.g. MANPADS (Attractive to Criminal and Terrorist Organisations (ACTO))	Severe	Unlikely	Medium	Reduce the number of personnel with access to that location. Keep the contents of the room classified if possible.	Low

Phase 2. Development (Time allocation - 70 min)

Stage 2 (Time allocation 25 mins) – Risk Assessment for Weapons Storage

- Discuss the importance of physical security for weapons which includes building or container suitability and internal racking systems.
- Explore the use of fencing or other security infrastructures on the perimeters to control access and observation.
- Highlight the need to adopt a suitable standard operating procedure. Give examples and discuss.
- Discuss the various types of access control measures that can be employed to safely store weapons.
- Discuss the secure transportation of weapons


- Introduce the concept of a Weapon Security Plan, discussing the principles of physical security and outlining the several factors that need to be considered.
- Provide the participants with an example of a complete physical security risk assessment for a weapons storage area. Work through this risk assessment with the participants to evaluate it and ask questions to check learning and understanding.



Phase 2. Development (Time allocation - 70 min)

Stage 3 (Time allocation 25 mins) – participant Exercise

Slide 37




Exercise Brief

- In Camp TEKKLA in Sector 1 of UNAC mission in CARANA, the Force intends to deploy two new companies as part of a surge which has been mandated to prepare for the upcoming election.
- One of the companies will be a Force Police Unit (FPU) and the other company will be a quick reaction force of military personnel.

Phase 2. Development (Time allocation - 70 min)

Stage 3 (Time allocation 25 mins) – participant Exercise

- In groups, the participants are to undertake a Security assessment for the safe storage of weapons based on the UN CARANA scenario.
- The participants will examine the provided security information, storage conditions and weapons allotments and design a suitable Security Plan to ensure the safe storage of the listed weapons.
- Instructors are to work closely with the groups to help them identify hazards, develop mitigating factors and compile a suitable Weapon Security Plan for this operation.
- When the groups have completed their groupwork, work through the answers with the class and ask questions.
- All 'Exercise Brief' and 'Exercise Deliverables' slides in this file to be printed and distributed to participants (slides 37- 42)



Exercise Brief


- The main government opposition candidate in the elections is a former rebel turned politician.
- The opposition party have been very critical of the UNAC mission saying that the peacekeepers are doing more damage to the country than good.
- They highlight the case of the spread of Welly Belly; a rare disease which has ravaged the country and has been claimed to be introduced by some of the peacekeepers.

Phase 2. Development (Time allocation - 70 min)

Stage 3 (Time allocation 25 mins) – participant Exercise

- In groups, the participants are to undertake a Security assessment for the safe storage of weapons based on the UN CARANA scenario.
- The participants will examine the provided security information, storage conditions and weapons allotments and design a suitable Security Plan to ensure the safe storage of the listed weapons.
- Instructors are to work closely with the groups to help them identify hazards, develop mitigating factors and compile a suitable Weapon Security Plan for this operation.
- When the groups have completed their groupwork, work through the answers with the class and ask questions.

Slide 39



Main idea/objective for slide:

Highlight main points on map for task



Exercise Brief

- Last year during the rainy season half of the TEKKLA camp area was flooded by over 1m of water. The country is prone to heavy lightning and thunderstorms.
- The new units will each need to maintain one platoon at a 1 hour notice to move.
- A second platoon must be on a 3 hour notice to move
- The remainder of each unit will be on a 24 hour notice to move.




Exercise Brief

- The FPU have 4 public order platoons, each with 5 shotguns, 30 tasers, 5 grenade launchers and one sniper rifle. One security platoon with 30 rifles and 4 shotguns and one community engagement platoon with 30 pistols. The FPU also maintains a pool of 30 pistols for officers as needed. The FPU also have 3 working police dogs.
- The QRF has a typical company weapons requirement with 150 personnel weapons, 3 mortars, 20 RPG launchers and 4 sniper rifles.



Exercise Deliverables

- Prepare a risk assessment for the deployment of these units to Camp TEKKLA (camp only, not the movement of the reinforcing units)
- The assessment should be used to then generate a storage plan for the weapons
- The required mitigation measures such as fencing and additional security measures must be clearly highlighted.



Lesson overview

- Describe the UN policies on small arm control.
- Discuss the location parameters of a weapon store and the principles of the physical security of weapons
- Discuss inventory management, reporting losses and investigations, and determining surplus weapon stocks
- Discuss the secure transportation of weapons
- Examine commonly occurring failures related to weapon controls
- Evaluate a completed security risk assessment for weapon storage
- Compile a Weapon Security Plan based on a provided risk assessment

Summary

In this lesson, participants explored secure weapon storage practices in UN T/PCC operations, aligning with UN policies on small arm control. Key learning points included:

- Participants gained an understanding of UN policies governing small arm control, emphasizing the importance of compliance and adherence to international standards.
- Engage in discussions about the optimal location parameters for weapon storage and the principles of ensuring the physical security of weapons, ensuring safe and secure storage practices.
- Participants explored best practices for inventory management, reporting losses and investigations, and determining surplus weapon stocks, ensuring accountability and transparency in weapon management.
- Explore safety protocols and best practices for the secure transportation of weapons, minimizing risks associated with transportation while ensuring compliance with regulations.
- Participants analyzed common failures related to weapon controls, identifying areas for improvement and implementing corrective measures to enhance weapon management practices.
- Participants evaluated completed security risk assessments for weapon storage, ensuring that storage facilities meet security standards and mitigate potential risks effectively.
- Practice compiling a comprehensive Weapon Security Plan based on a provided risk assessment, ensuring that all security measures are documented and implemented effectively to safeguard weapons.

Slide 44



Main idea/objective for slide:
Look ahead to the next lesson of the course:
STX ERA & Camp Takeover

Module 3



Weapon Management Wrap Up

At the conclusion of Module 3, a few concluding points are worth noting:

- Weapon management cannot be undertaken by untrained personnel and requires specific training due to its complexity.
- Comprehensive weapon management involves policy understanding, physical security principles, inventory oversight, and loss investigation protocols. It also includes surplus stock assessment, transportation security, and addressing control weaknesses. By thoroughly addressing these aspects, peace operations can improve operational preparedness.
- Effective weapon management reduces the risk of diversion and enhances civilian